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CASENOTES 
A Constitutional Standard of Review for Permit Conditions, Ex-
actions, and Linkage Programs: Nollan v_ California Coastal 
Commission' - In an effort to a lleviate urban housing shortages, 
several cities in the United States have imposed an obligation on 
office building developers to construct or pay for the construction 
of low and moderate income housing as a condition for granting a 
building permit. 2 This type of permit condition, known as a linkage 
program, raises the possibility that a "taking" has occurred. T he 
"takings clause" of the fifth amendment of the United States Con-
sti tution states that private property sha ll not be taken for public 
use without just compensation. ' Where government exercises its 
power of eminent domain and actually takes possession of private 
property, clearly a "taking" has occurred, requiring just compen-
sation. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that where a government regulatio n goes "too far" in restrict-
ing a private property owner 's use of his land, a taking has also 
occurred' The Court has held that the application of a zoning 
regulation to private property goes "too far" and constitu tes a "tak-
ing" if it does not "substantially advance" legitimate state interests.' 
Thus, the question of whether or not a linkage program constitutes 
a taking depends on whether such a program "substantiall y ad-
vances" legitimate state interests . 
The United States Supreme Court, in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, considered this issue of when permit conditions "sub-
' 107 S. Cl. 3 141 (1987). 
t Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community B f!Ileji l A S5t'SSIIIl'fl is and 
Lmkagt PaYlnl!lll.s: A Brief HisIO')' o[ Ullld Developllttml Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PH-OilS. 5, 
6-7 (1987). Boston and San Francisco are presemly the on I)' twO cities that have adopted 
linkage programs. Several other U.S. cities, such as Chicago, Denver and Seattle. have or arc 
exploring the possibilities of adopti ng linkage pmgra ms. Jd. at 6-7; Conners & High. 'J!u 
ExpandingCircie of EXQclio1lJ: From Dedication 10 Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS .. 78 ( 198/). 
, The fifth amendment of the United Stales ConstilUtion stalt!S: "nor shall private prop-
Crt)' be taken for public use, wit hoUljus l compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth 
~mendment itself applies onl y to the federal govern ment. The Su preme Court , .howcvc.r,. has 
It\corporated the fifth amendment inlO the fourteenth amendment, and thus IlS proVISions 
ha\'C been held to apply to the states throug h the founeelllh amendment. Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 107 S. Ct. 1232. 1240 n. 10 (1987): Pe nn Cenl. Transp. 
Co. \'. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 , 122 ( 1978); Chicago, B & Q R.R. Co. v. Chicago. 166 
U.s. 226, 238-39 (1897). 
1 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon , 260 U.S. 393. 4 15 ( 1922). . ( _ "" ~ Agins v. Cit)' of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255. 260 ( 1980); Penll Cmtml, 438 U.S. al 121 ( 
us< r '. . . k' "r 'casonabl y necessa ry 10 the CSlncuon on real property ma y consutute a ta mg I not I , 
dftttuation of a subslantial public purpose.. ."). 
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stantially advance" a legitimate state inte resl." In Nollan, in return 
for granting permission to the Nollans to re place a small bungalow 
on their shorefront property wIth a la rger, three bedroom home, 
the California Coastal Commission (Com mission) required the Nol-
lans to grant an easement a llowing the public to pass over their 
property between their seawall and the ocean. 7 The Nollans argued 
that the imposition of the easement condition constituted a taking 
without just compensation S In response, the Commission con-
tended that the easement was necessary to alleviate the adverse 
impact of the Nollans' development on public access to the shore-
front and private access to the beach '" In ruling for the Nollans, 
the Court held that in order for a permit condition to "substantially 
advance" a legitimate state purpose, there must be a sufficient nexus 
between the permit condition and the public need created by the 
development that the condition seeks to alleviate lO 
This case note examines what local governments must do to 
es tablish this "sufficient nexus" after Nollan and this requirement's 
likely effect on linkage programs. Section I discusses the standard 
of review applied by the United States Supreme Court to land use 
regulations imposed by governmental bodies." Section II examines 
the various standards utilized by state courts in reviewing permit 
condltIons. '2 Section III presents the Nollan decision, detailing the 
majority'S holding and reasoning and the dissenting opinions filed 
In the case.'" Section I V analyzes the Court's holding in Nollan in 
lIght of ItS pnor decisions and what the Nallan decision means for 
permit conditions in the future. 14 Section V examines the impact 
the Nollan decision will have on linkage programs, a particular form 
of permIt condltionI.; This casenote concludes that in order for 
permit conditions to avoid constituting a taking after Nollan, gav-
el nmental bodIes must clearly establish that the imposed condition d . f 
oes In act address the adverse impact of the development on the 
community. 
, - ... ~ .. 
(, 107 S. C l. 3 141, 3 146 ( 1987), 
' /d . a t 3 1 4~ Sa inrra not 102 08 d 
, d _ :. J' es - an accQmpan),jng text. I . ,II 3 143. 
~ Nul/{j'I. 107 S. C l. at 3 143 See h,r " . 
I II !Vollall 107 S C . lyra. notes 106- 08 and accompanymg text. 
, . L at 3147-48. 
:,: ~el' l:lI!ra notes 16-43 and accompanying lexl 
I: ~ee I.'~'{j notes 44-98 and accompanying texL' 
n ' /II) ra notes 99- 163 and acco m a:1 ,in T 
:: SeI' 1. 1/~·a notes 164-86 and <lccOm~an~ingg ~::~. 
ee l/lJ m nOles 187 90 d .. 
- an accompan ying leXL 
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l. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S STANDARD OF REVI EW 
FOR LAND USE REGULATIONS 
In a series of cases beginning ea rly in the 1900s, the United 
States Supreme Court has developed a standard of review for de-
termining when land use regulations imposed by government con-
stitute a taking of properly requiring compensation under the fifth 
amend ment. Under this standard , a land use regu lation constitutes 
a taking where it fails to "substantia ll y advance" a legitimate state 
i11lerest or denies a landowner economicall y viable use of his or her 
land. 16 In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, decided 
in 1922, the Supreme Court held that government could effectuate 
a taking requiring just compensation not only by exercising its 
power of eminent domain , but a lso by regulaling private property.17 
In Penmylvania Coal, a coal company sold the surface rights to a 
parcel of prope rty, but retained the right to mine the coal heneath 
the surface of the property. Following the transaction, Pennsylvania 
enacted legislation barring the mining of coal in such a way as would 
cause the subsidence of any house, unless the house was owned by 
the owner of the underlying coal and was more than one hundred 
fifty feet from another person's improved property. IS Although 
private property may be regulated to a ce rta in extent, J ustice 
Holmes ruled, when the government applies to a property owner a 
land use regulation that goes "too far, " such an application consti-
tutes a taking of property. Because the Pennsylvania law rendered 
the coal commercially impractical to mine , the Court held that the 
regulation went "too far" and therefore constituted a taking. 19 
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court further articu lated 
when a government land use regulation goes "too far" and constI-
tutes a taking of property. In Neclow v. Cily of Cambridge, decided 
by the Court in 1928, Cambridge had adopted a zoning ordinance 
dividing the city into three types o f u se districts : "reside ntIal ," "busl-
ness," and "unrestricted. "20 T he plaintiff owned a parcel of land, a 
one hundred foot wide strip of which marked the eastern boundary 
of the "residential" district in the area. The remall1der o( the pla1l1-
tiff's tract was included in an "unrestricted" zone. 21 The plaintiff 
16 Agms, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127, 13811.6. 
17 Petlllsyfvallia Coal, 260 U.S. at 4 15. 
18 1d. at 412- 13. 
19 1d. at 414- 16. 
" 217 U.s. 183, 185 (1928). 
21 rd. at 186--87. 
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argued that as applied to him, the city ordinance constituted ,~ 
deprivation of property 111 vIolatIon of the fourteenth amendment.-
Finding for the plaintiff, the Court held th~t where a land use 
regulation does not bear a "substantial relatIon to a pohce power 
objective such as public health , safety, morals, or general welfare, 
that regulation effectuates a takll1g. Applyll1g thIs standard, the 
Court held that the health , safety, convel1lence, and general welfare 
of the community were not promoted by zoning the one hundred 
foot strip of plaintiff 's property " residential ," as the boundary of 
the "residential" district could have been drawn in such a way as to 
exclude the one hundred foot strip with li ttle if any impact on the 
community.23 Accordingly, the Court found that the zoning ordi-
nance as applied to the plaintiff did not meet the "substantially 
related" standard.24 
In 1978, fifty years following its decision in N eetow, the Court 
refined its standard of review for land use regulations in Penn 
CentTaI TTanst)ortation Co. v. City oj N ew York .25 In Penn Central, the 
City of New York had adopted a Landmarks Preservation Law 
intended to preserve historic sites within the city."6 The Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Company (Penn Centra l) owned Grand Central 
Terminal , which was designated a "landmark" by the city in 1967 
under the Landmarks Preservation Law. In 1968, Penn Central 
applied to the Landmarks Preservation Commission (Landmarks 
Commission) for permission to construct an office building atop the 
terminaP' The Landmarks Commission denied permission for the 
constructIOn on the grounds that it would overwhelm the original 
deSIgn of the terminal and reduce it from a historic landmark to a 
mere c uriosity. Penn Central then filed suit, claiming that the ap-
plIcatIon of the Landmarks Preservation Law to its property con-
stituted a takll1g WIthout compensation in violation of the fifth and 
fourtee nth amendments.28 
Finding in favor of the Landmarks Commission , the Supreme 
C~,urt held that a land use regulation effectuates a taking ifit either 
IS not reasonably related to the effectuation of a substantial public 
:n Id. at 185. 
:1:1 I d. at 188. 
~N Id. at 188-89. 
" 438 U.S. 122. 127- 38 ( 1978) . 
W i d . at 108-09. 
n /d. at 11 5- 16. 
28 1d. ,H 11 7- 19. 
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purpose,"'9 or does not permit an economically viable use o f the 
property to which it is applied.'o The Court noted that it agreed 
with the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals that the 
preservation of landmarks under the city ordinance benefited all 
New York residents and structures, both economically and in terms 
of improving the quality of life in the city. The Court concluded 
that the restrictions imposed on Penn Central we re "substantially" 
related to the promotion of the general welfare. ' l The Court further 
concluded that the imposition of the restrictions on Penn Centra l 
did not deny the company all viable economic use of their property. 
The imposed restrictions did not constitute a taking, concluded the 
Court, because the property's use as a terminal guaranteed Penn 
Central a "reasonable return"32 and because the city had made the 
rights to build above the property transferable to at leas t eight other 
parcels in the vicinity of the terminal.'3 
The Supreme Court further refined this standard of review in 
the 1980 case of Agins v. City of Tiburon." In Agins, the plaintiff 
landowner purchased five acres of unimproved land, intending to 
develop the property as a residential area." Follo wing the purchase, 
the state of California required Tiburon to dra ft a general plan 
governing land use and the development of open-space land. Ac-
cordingly, the city adopted two ordinances modifying ex isting zon-
ing regulations. Under the new zoning provisions, use of the plain-
tiff 's five acre tract was restricted by density limitations to the 
construction of between one and five single family residences. '" 
Following the adoption of the ordinances, the plaintiffs brought 
suit on the grounds that the city had taken their property without 
just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.37 
The Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court's 
holding each the zoning ordinances on its face did not effectuate a 
taking.'s Citing Neetow and Penn Central, the Court held that a 
't'J ld. at 127. 
!(J Id. at J 38 n.36. 
'J Id. at 134-35, 138. 
~2 Id. at 136. 
" /d, ,It 137-38. 
" 441 U.S. 255, 260 ( 1980). 
'~ /d. at 257. 
56 [d. 
31 Id. at 258. . 
Mid. at 259. The Coun did nol. consider the issue of whelilCr the o l'd inance ~s ,apphed 
constituted a taking of properly. [d. at 260. The Court noted that. because the plamuffs had 
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zonmg restrictIon constituted a taking where it "does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state mterestsor del1les an owner econom-
icall y viable use of his land."39 Applymg thIs standard, the Court 
held that the interests of preserving open space advanced by the 
ordinances had long been recognized by the Court as "legitimate 
state interests."4o Furthermore, the Court noted , the ordinances by 
their terms served the city's interest in assuring carefu l and orderly 
development of residential property and the provision of adequate 
open space areas 4 ! Accordingly, the Court concluded, the ordi-
nance "substantially advanced" these legitimate state interests. The 
Court also held that the city ordinances did not constitute a taking 
by denying the landowner economically viable use of his property" 
Although the ordinances limited development, the Court noted, the 
plaintiffs could potentially build as many as five residences on their 
prime residential property, thus guaranteeing a reasonable return 
on the property. Accordingly, the Court found that the ordinances 
adopted by the city of Tiburon did not constitute a taking'3 
Thus, under the takings clause of the fifth amendment, a land 
use regulation imposed by the government may constitute a taking 
in. two ways. First , a land use regulation constitutes a taking if it 
taIls to "substantially advance" a legitimate state interest. Second, 
the application of a land use regu lation to a property owner is a 
taking whe n it d e nies the property owner economically viable use 
of his or he r land. 
II. STANDARDS UTILIZED BY STATE COURTS TO REVIEW PERMIT 
CONDITIONS 
Faced with dwind ling contributions from the federal govern-
ment and severe housing shortages, some cities in the United States 
have adopted a form of permit condition called linkage to deal with 
these dIfficu ltIes." Although linkage programs differ in some re-
not su bmitted a plan for d ey I d . h . 
h I . . e opment un CI t e new ordmances, there existed no controversy as to \\1 et le I' [he o rdinances as ap red t I I· · Coun CO il 1 d d h . Plot lC p amuffs constituted a taking. /d. Thus, the 
c u e , t e only ISsue was whethe th f· I 
cOnstitUlcd a lakin . . . reenactment 0 the ordmances themse ves 
39 1d. g, I.e., whether the ordmances were in valid 011 their face. Id. 
i O Id. at 26 1- 62 (ci t ing Pe 1 C t I 438 U 
4 16 U.S. I 9 ( 1974)'. E rd n t en ra , .5. at 129; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, ~! Id. a't 262. , ti C I v. Ambler Co. , 272 U.S. 365, 394- 95 (1926)). 
42 1d. at 26 1- 63. 
~ ~ Id . a t 262-63 . 
.... Conners & Hig h supra I 2 
' lOte, at 78; Delaney, Gordon & Hess. The Needs-Nexus Analysis: 
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speets depending on the particular city, a ll such programs are based 
on the principle that because office developments attract additional 
people to _ the city,. they necessarily exacerbate the city's ho using 
shortage:" Accordll1gly, the argument goes, office develope rs may 
be required to alleviate this burden by paying for the construction 
of low and middle-income ho using as a condition precedent to the ir 
obtaining a building permit4 6 Deve lopers have never directly chal-
lenged the constitu tionality of these linkage programsY 
Developers have, however, cha llenged a closely re lated form of 
permit condition, the subdivisio n exaction, on the grounds that it 
constitutes a taking of property without just compensation.'s The 
subdivision exaction is conceptually identical to linkage; it is a re-
quirement that a subdivider dedicate a portion of the proposed 
development or donate a fee in lieu thereof for public purposes 
prior to obtaining subdivision approval· 9 To avoid a declaration 
that subdivision exactions constitute an unconstitutional taking with-
out just compensation , courts have required that such conditions 
be reasonable. 50 Various state courts have applied one of three tests 
in determining whe ther a subdi vision exaction meets this require-
ment of reasonableness : the "ratio nal relationship" test, the 
"uniquely and specificall y attributable" test and the "rational nexus" 
test 51 
The "rational relationship" test is the easiest of these three 
standards for a govern ment to satisfy. Under the rat.ional relation-
t\ Vtlified Test [or Validating SubdivisioTl Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAw & 
COt.;TB!P. PROBS. 139, 145 (1987); Diamond , The Sa'/1 PrwlCisco Office H Ollsing Program: Social 
Polk), UlIdtrwnUeP/ by Private E,,/el-prise. 7 H ARV. ENVTL. L. R EV. 449. 449-50 ( 1983). 
4~ Smith , supra note 2. at 25: Porter, T he O/flu/Housing LiT/Rage Issue, 44 URSAI' LAND 16, 
20 (Sept. 1985); Delanc),. Gordon & Hess, supra note 44, at 128; Diamond , sU/Jra note 44. at 
449. 
+6Smilh , supra nOle 2, at 25-27; Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 44, <Il 128-29. 
1, Delancy, Gordon & I-less. supra note 44 , at 14 3; POrle r, sU/Jra note 45. at 2 1. 
~8 See , e.g., Associated Home Builders. Inc. v. Wa lnut Creek, 4 Ca l. 3d 633 , 484 P.2d 
606,94 Cal. Rptr. 630, a/>/Jeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 ( 197 1); Grupe v. Ca liforn i.a Coasta l 
Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148,2 12 Cal. Rpu·. 578 ( 1985); Vla ld Cor p. v. Melropol ltan Dade 
COUnty, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1976); Krughoff v. Naperville, 68 III. 2d 352, 369 N. E.2d 892 
(1977); Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Vill age of Mo un t Prospect, 22 III . 2d 375. 176 
N.E.2d 799 (196 1); Collis v. C it)' o f Bloomington , 3 10 Minn. 5,246 N.W.2d 1.9 (1976); Home 
Builder's Ass'n v. Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (~·( o. 1977); J enad , Inc. v: ~lty of Scar~da lc, 
18 N. Y.2d 78, 21 8 N.E.2d 673, 27 1 N. Y. S.2d 955 ( 1966); Frank AnSlllll1. Inc. \'. City of 
Cranston , 107 R.l. 63, 264 A.2d 9 10 (1970) ; Ca ll v. West J ordan, 606 P.2d 2 17 (Utah 1979); 
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Fa lls, 28 Wis. 2d 608. 137 N .W.2d 442 (1965), a/Jpeal 
dismissed, 385 U.S . 4 (1966). 
4!J E. MCQUILLAN. Tm: LAW OF MUN!CII'AL CORPORATIONS § 25 .11 8d , at 349 (3d cd. 1983). 
)() ld. 
~ I Delaney, Cordon & I-less, supra note 44, at 147-56. 
910 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:903 
ship test, applied by the courts of California, a municipality must 
establish that the subdivision exactIOn bears a rational or reasonable 
relationship to the needs arising from the development of the sub-
division '2 The California courts have generally deferred to the 
judgment of state and loca l governments in evaluating whether this 
requirement has been satisfied, requmng only a showmg that the 
subdivision have a general impact on the public need that the con-
dition seeks to alleviate.53 A municipality need not show that the 
particular subdivision subjected to the condition is the sole creator 
of the need addressed by the cond ition ' " 
The Supreme Court of California applied the "rational rela-
tionship" test in upholding a subdivision exaction ordinance in As-
sociated Home Builders oj G,-eatn East Bay, Inc. v. City oj Walnut Creek." 
Walnut Creek, pursuant to state enabling legislation, had adopted 
an ordinance requiring that a subdivision developer dedica te a por-
tion of his or her land or donate a fee in lieu thereof for park or 
recreational faci lities as a condition precedent to subdivision ap-
proval s6 The court rejected the developer'S contention that the 
imposed condition could be justified o nly by showing that the sub-
division was the sole cause of the deficiency of parks and recrea-
tional facilities the condition was designed to remedy. Instead, the 
court held that as long as a municipality could show a general need 
for parks and recreational facilities created by present and future 
subdIVISIons, a subdivision exaction designed to meet these overall 
needs of the community was constitutiona!." 
I n finding this standard satisfied, the court displayed great 
deference to lh~ state's judgment in passing the enabling legislation 
~nd to the CIty s Judgment III adoptlllg the dedication ordinance. 
rhecoun dId not determine whether the condition imposed on the 
partIcular subdIVISIon at issue actua lly addressed the impact of the 
subdIVISIon on the community. Instead, the court simply noted that 
Walnut Creek had experienced an enormous populatio n growth 
over the past decade 5. R'd I ' 
. apl popu atlOn growth and a correspond-
~2 See iel . a t 148. 
634~;:.ss~(lled Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d at 637-40, 484 P.2d at 6 10-11, 94 Cal. RptT. at 
. . CIII/le. 166 Cal App. 3d at 164-66 212 C I R 
!t-I AssadateeJ H ' , a. ptr. at 587-89. 
634-36- Grupe 1 6~"~. f l~ders'34 Cal. 3d at 637-40, 484 P.2d at 610-11, 94 Ca l. Rptr. at 
, ,, ) a. pp. d at 164-66, 2 12 Cal. Rptr 587- 89 ~~ 4 Cal. 3d 633 484 P 2d 606 94 C I '. ~ Id. at 636 484 P 2d ' 609 ' a. RptT. 630. appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (197 1). 
)7 '. at , 94 Cal. RplT at 633 ~ I d. at ~39-40 , 484 P.2d at 6 1 I , 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635 
Id. al 639, 484 P.2d at 6 11 , 94 Ca l. Rplr. at 635. . 
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ing disappearance of ope~ land , the court noted , were urgent prob-
lems faced by communlUes throughout California.59 Given the se-
verity of these problems, the court maintained that Walnut Creek 
need not show that the particular developer subject to the permit 
condition would , solely by the development of his subdivision, in-
crease the need for parks and open space to the extent that addi-
tional land was required. The existence of these urgent needs and 
their necessary exacerbatio n by the addi tio n of new subdivisions to 
the community, the court held , were sufficient to justify requiring 
a developer to ded icate a portion of the proposed subdivision or 
pay a fee in lieu thereof for parks and recreational facilities as a 
condition precedent to subdivision approval.60 
In Grupe v. California Coastal Commission, the California Court 
of Appeal also applied the "rational relationship" standard in up-
holding a permit condi tion imposed on a property owner6 ! As a 
condition to receiving approval to build a home on his shorefront 
property, Mr. Grupe was required ·to grant an easement allowipg 
the public to pass to and fro along the shorefront between his 
seawall and the ocean .62 Citing Associated Home Builders, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal he ld that a particular development need not 
create the need for a particular exaction .63 Instead , the court ruled 
that there need only be an indirect relatio nship between a proposed 
exaction and the public need to which the development contributes. 
Thus, the court continued , the exaction need only be designed to 
meet the public need to which the project contributes in an inci-
dental way."4 
In applying this standard , the court did not examine the factual 
record to establish whether the condition imposed on Mr. Grupe 
actually addressed the impact of his development on public access 
to the shorefront65 Instead, the court noted that Mr. Grupe's de-
velopment was part of an ove rall process of development occurring 
in California reducing public access. Exhibiting great defe rence to 
the Commission 's judgment, the court did not inquire into th,e 
factual record beyond this observation , acceptll1g the Commission s 
~ ld. at 638-39, 648, 484 P.2d at 6 10-11 . 6 18, 94 Ca l. RptL at 634- 35, 642. 
60 [d. at 639-40, 484 P.2d at 6 11 , 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635 . 
.. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 2 12 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985). 
MId. at 156, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 58 1. 
f>! /d. at 166 & n. l1 , 2 12 Cal. Rptr. at 589 & n . II. 
64 ld. at 166, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589. 
MId. at 166 & n. ll , 2 12 Cal. Rplr. al589 & n. 11. 
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division at hand. 79 The imposition of an across-the-board 7% re-
quirement was the refore necessa ril y invalid, the court stated, as it 
failed to take in to account to wha t extent a partIcular subdIVISIOn 
itself created the need the condition sought to alleviate.so 
In sum , in colltrast to the "rational relationship" test, the 
"uniquely and specifica ll y attributable" test imposes a substantial 
burden on a municipality in establishing the constitutionally re-
quired nexus between a pe rmit condition and the public need that 
the imposed condition seeks to address. Unl ike the "rational rela-
tionship" standard , the "uniquely and specifi ca lly attributable" test 
requires more than a showing that a general community need exists 
and that the condition imposed on the subdivision addresses that 
need. In short, courts applying this test require that the condition 
be shown to remedy a need created solely by the particular subdi-
vision at hand. 
As an alternative to the "rationa l relationship" and "uniquely 
and specifica lly attributable" tests, some courts apply a third stan-
dard in reviewing the constitu tionality of subdivision exactions: the 
"rational nexus" standard."1 In contrast to the "uniquely and spe-
cificall y attributable" test, courts applying the "rational nexus" stan-
dard do not require local governments to establish that the pro-
posed subdivision is solely responsible for the public need the 
Im posed condition is intended to address.s2 A community may im-
pose a permn condition without effectuating a taking where a sub-
divISIon does not solely create but m erely exacerbates a public need 
crea ted by a community's overall developmentS' 
On the other hand, courts applying the "rational nexus" stan-
dard do not afford local governments the great deference typical 
of courts app lYIng the rational relationship standard. Unwilling to 
relywtthout further inquiry on the judgment of local governmental 
bod ies, courts applying this standard examine the factual record to 
determine whether an actual, concrete connection exists between 
79 1d. a t 68-69. 264 A.2d al 9 13 
M id. a l 7 1, 264 A.2d at 914. . 
81 See, e.g. Watd Corp v M I· 
Collis v Cit ~ f BI . " clro po !tan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla . 1976); 
Ass'n v . CitYYOf K" oomlcn,g(Olsl'.. 3 1 0 Min n . 5 , 18, 246 N. W.2d 19, 26 ( 1976); Home Builders 
. ..nsas Ity :)5 S W ?d 832 835 
of Pla infield , 117 N.H. 8 17' 823 3'7 .- , (Mo. )977); Land/ Vest Prop., Inc. v. Town 
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608 6 1'7- 18' 9 A; 2d 200, 204 ( 1977); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee 
{ J966);sualso Dela n e~ G -d ' ~37 N.W.2d 442. 447 (1965). appeal dismissed , 385 U.S. 4 
82 Waldo 338 So 2d' at~ ~n ~ Hess , sup~a note 44 , at 152- 54. 
83 ~V(lld. 338 $ 0. 2d at 8~~: j01.d(ln , 28 W~s. 2d at 617-20, 137 N.W.2d al445-47 . 
• j mdu1/ , 28 WIS. 2d a t 6 17-18, 137 N.W.2d at 447. 
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the exaction and the needs created by the proposed subdivision8' 
In Wald Corp. v. M et1'Opolitan Dade County, the Flo rida Court of 
Appeal applied the "rationa l nexus" test in upho lding a subdivision 
exaction ordinance.s, Metropolitan Dad e County had adopted an 
ordinance requiring that a subdivide r d edicate land to the county 
for canal purposes as a condition to obtaining subdivisio n plat ap-
prova!.86 In determining the standard o f review to apply to permit 
conditions, the court rej ected both the "ratio nal rela tio nship" and 
the "uniquely and specifica lly attributable" tests. s, T he court held 
that, although the "rational re lationship" test allowed municipalities 
substantial fl exibility in formulating comprehensive plans for future 
growth and develo pment, it afforded too much defe rence to local 
governments in determining whethe r the imposition o f a permit 
condition was valid . Because the impositio n of a permit condition 
affected constitutio na lly protected pro perty rights, the court held 
that a more stringent standard gra nting less d efe rence to local 
government judgment was required to ensure that local gove rn-
ments did not abuse the police power in imposing exactions.ss 
The court also rej ected the "unique ly and specifically attribut-
able" test, on the grounds that it placed too g reat a restriction on 
the ability of loca l governments to impose exactio ns o n subdividers . 
In most instances, stated the court, a municipality wo uld be able to 
show only that a subdivision contributed to a community wide prob-
lem rather than created the public burden 89 Ado pting the "uniquely 
and specifically attributable" test, concluded the court, would essen-
tially remove the subdivision exaction from local governments as a 
tool for planning for growth and d evelo pment in the community90 
As an alternative, the court adopted the "rational nexus" ap-
proach for reviewing the constitutionality of subdivision exactions 91 
The court held that government need not show that the imposed 
exaction would be necessary to meet a need so lely a ttributable to 
one particular subdivision. Yet, unlimited deference wo uld not be 
afforded to legislative judgment; local governments would be re-
quired to prove to the court that continued approval o f subdiVISions 
lH See iuJra nOles 92-94, 97-98 and accompa nyin g text. 
~~ Wald, 338 So. 2d a l 868. 
116 1d. at 864. 
" Id. at 866- 67. 
~ Jd. at 866. 
!!'.l Id. at 867 (emphasis added). 
9U Id. 
9] /d. 
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could increase the amO ulll of se rvices the community would have 
to provide. Applying this standard , the court examined the record 
to determine whether the ev ide nce submiued established that the 
impositio n of the exacti o n did indeed allevia te the adverse impact 
of the proposed subdi vision on the public."" The court noted that 
the proposed subdivision was in an area prone to periodic flooding, 
and that runoff from the proposed subdi visio n wou ld adversely 
affect property both u pstream a nd downstream if the canal exaction 
were not imposed. Furthermore, property within the subdivision 
wou ld be damaged in the event of flood ing if the condition was not 
imposed. Given these facts , the court held that the imposition of 
the exaction on the proposed subdi visio n wo uld alleviate an adverse 
effect of the subdivisio n o n the public." Accordingly, the court 
upheld the imposi tio n of the exaction condition on the develop-
ment.94 
In jordan v. Village of M enomonee Falls, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin applied a simi lar standard upholding an ordinance 
adopted by the village. T he o rdina nce required that a developer 
dedicate a portion o f the proposed subdivisio n or donate a fee in 
lieu thereof to provide for schools, parks, and playgrounds as a 
cond itio n for subdivi sion approvaL9; In upholding the ordinance 
as a va lid exercise of the po lice po wer, the court rejected the ar-
gument that a municipality must show that the dedica tion condition 
was re.quired to meet a need created solely by the subdivision at 
hand. fhe court, however, refused to de fer to the judgment of local 
governmellls that a sufficient basis for imposing an exaction existed. 
Instead , the court required that the evidence establish a reasonable 
connection between the exactio n a nd the needs created by the sub-
division. 96 
. To thi s end , the court he ld that a city or town must submit 
eV Idence to the co t . bl· h · f 
. . . ur esta IS mg that the general construction 0 
subd,v,s,o ns over sevel·al · ·bl c · . h 
. . yea l s was responsl e lor mcreasll1g I e 
population In the community."7 Where the factua l record did not 
reveal cOlllravening·d h .. . . 
. . eVI ence, suc as an md,catlon tha t the city had 
an eX lstlllg, adequate supply of land for recreational and school 
purposes, Or tha t the acquisition of additional land would be re-
9'J I d. at 868. 
\/, 1t1. 
'H I d. ill 868-69. 
~~Jo"d(l": 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N .W.2d 442. 
I d. at 617- 18. 137 N.W.2d al 447 
\j7 1tI. a l 617- 18. 137 N. \V.2d a t 448: 
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quired regardless of whether the proposed subdivision was con-
structed, a reasonable basis existed for requiring that a subdivider 
dedicate land for school, park, and recreational purposes'"8 
Thus, prior to Nollan, state courts subjected subdivision exac-
tions to the "rational relation" test, the "unique ly and specifically 
attributable" test, or the "rational nexus" standard to determine 
their constitutionality, depending on the jurisdiction involved. In 
Nollan, the United States Supreme Court for the first time adopted 
a standard for review of conditions placed upon development. 
Ill. NOLLAN V. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION 
The case of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission began when 
James and Marilyn Nollan decided to demolish a small bungalow 
and replace it with a three bedroom house with an ocean view."9 
The Nollans own a lot fronting on the Pacific Ocean in Ventura 
County, California. A public beach, Faria County Park, lies a quarter 
mile north of the Nollans' property, and another public beach , " the 
Cove," lies 1800 feet south of their property. An e ight foot high 
seawall divide's that part of the Nollans' property that is beach from 
the rest of the 10t. '00 The mean high water line delineates the 
property's oceanside boundary. 'o , 
The Nollans initially leased the lot with an option to purchase 
the property from the lessor. The option to purchase required the 
Nollans to demolish and replace the small bungalow on the prop-
erty, which had fall en into disrepair. Deciding to replace the bun-
galow and purchase the property, the Nollans app lied for a coastal 
development permit from the California Coastal Commission ,,02 
seeking permission to demolish the bungalow and replace it with a 
three bedroom house consistent with the size and sty le of other 
homes in the neighborhood. Over the Nollans' objections, the Com-
mission granted the permit subject to the Nollans' recordmg of a 
deed restrictio n on the property granting the public an easement 
of lateral access across that portion of their lot between the ocean 
'}S Id. For other cases applying a "rational nex us" ana lysis. see, e.g., Collis, 3 10 Minn. at 
18,246 N.W.2d at 26; Home Builders Association, 555 S.W.2d a t 835; Lalld/Vest, 11 7 N.H. a t 
823. 379 A.2d at 204 . 
" 107 S. Ct. 314 1. 3 143 ( 1987). 
100 f d. 
101 f d. 
102 fd. 
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and the seawall , facilitating public access to Fa ria County Park and 
"the Cove." 10 3 
On June 3, 1982, the Nolla ns filed a petition .in the Ventura 
County Superior Court, requesting that the condmon Imposed by 
the Commission be declared II1 vahd because the Commission had 
fa iled to submit evidence that the Nollans' pro posed construction 
would directl y affect public access to the beach. lo, The superior 
court ruled in favo r o f the No llans, remanding the case to the 
Coastal Commission for rehearing on this issue. ' 05 
At the subsequent hearing, the Commissio n made several find-
ings o f fact and again imposed the conditio n. lOG The Commission 
found that the Nollans' proposed ho me wo uld reduce the public's 
view of the ocean, contributing to the develo pment of a wall of 
residences. T his wa ll , the Commissio n concluded , would prevent 
the pu blic fro m seeing tha t the re was a stretch o f access ible coastline 
in the area. "" In addition , the Commissio n found that the Nollans' 
develo pment wo uld increase private use o f the waterfront to the 
detriment o f the po pula tion gene ra ll y. Because the new house 
would bu rden the public's access to the shore , the Commission held 
that the Nollans were required to alleviate that burden by granting 
a public easement across their pro perty, thus providing additional 
latera l access to the public beaches in the a rea. 10 . 
T he No llans subsequently filed a petition with the Ventura 
County Superio r Court, arguing tha t the imposition of the permit 
condmon VIOla ted the takings clause of the fifth amendment, as 
apphed to the sta tes through the fourteenth amendment. 109 The 
superior court, avoiding the constitutional issue, held that the 
Coasta l Commission had not sufficiently established that the pro-
posed develo pment by the Nollans wo uld have an adve rse impact 
on publiC access to the water. The Commissio n was required to 
establish such a result under the Califo rnia Coastal Act of 1976. 
Accordlll gly, . the superior court held that the imposition of the 
access conditio n was invalid."o 
10l Id. 
10 .. I d. 
IO~ /d . 
100 ld. 
107 {d . at 3 143-44 . 
'tI1I /d. at 3 144 . 
'(!oJ /Ci. 
Iio ld. 
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The California Coastal Commission appealed the superior 
court's decision to the California Court of Appeal. 111 During the 
course of that appeal, the Nollans replaced the bungalow without 
notifying the Commission. The court of appeal reversed the holding 
of the superior court. The court found that the California Coastal 
Act of 1976 allowed the imposition of the easement condition.'l2 
The court also held that the condition was constitutional, basing its 
holding on one of its earlier d ecisions, Grupe v. California Coastal 
Commission, 1 13 
The court held the that facts of Grupe were identical to those 
presented by the Nollan development. Accordingly, the court ruled 
that the condition imposed by the Coastal Commission was not 
unconstitutional ll4 The court also held that the Nollans' claim that 
the imposition of the access condition constituted a ta king was with-
out merit, because although the condition reduced the value of the 
Nollans' property, it did not deprive them of all reasonable use of 
their property. I " 
The Nollans filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U nited 
States Supreme Court, arguing that the imposition of the access 
condition constituted a taking without just compensation in violation 
of the fifth amendment, as applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment." 6 The Supreme Court reversed the Calfornia 
court, holding that the imposition of the easement condition on the 
Nollans constituted a taking without just compensation. lI7 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, held that a permit condition must 
"substantially advance" a legitimate state interest to avoid an uncon-
stitutional taking of property. I IS The Court further held that, since 
the imposition of the easement condition did not even meet the 
rational relation standard proposed by the Commission as the 
proper test for reviewing permit conditions , the imposition of that 




Il' ld. (ciling Grupe. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148,212 Cal. Rptr. 578 ( 1985». See supra notes 
61-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of Grupe. 
lHNolla11, 107 S. Cl. al3 144. 
11~ Id. 
116 1d. at 3 145. 
117 [d. at 3150. 
I18 ld. at 3146, 3 150. 
Jig /d. at 3148. 
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a lengthy and 
vigorous dissent, arguing that the maJonty was applymg. a more 
rigid standard in reviewing the constItutIOnality of permit condi-
tions than had previously been used by the Court. 120 Furthermore, 
Justice Brennan argued , even under this new, more demanding 
standard , the Comm ission 's imposition of the easement condition 
on the Nollans was not an unconstitutional taking of property."1 
In N olLan , the Supreme Court held that an unconstitutional 
taking of property occurs where a pe rmit cond ition does not "sub-
stantially advance" a legitimate state interest. 122 T he Court found 
that the imposition of a permit condition on the Nollans requiring 
them to grant an easement providing late ral access between the two 
beaches adjoining their property did not substantiall y advance a 
legitimate state interest. Thus, the Court ru led that the permit 
condition constituted a taking of property without just compensa-
tion in violation of the firth and fourteenth amendments. I" 
In reaching its decision , the Court noted that had the Com-
mission simply required the Nollans to grant to the public an ease-
ment across the ir beachfront outright, a taking wou ld have oc-
curred, requiring just compensation to the Nollans .124 Under 
previous Supreme Court rulings , the Court noted , where govern-
mental action results in a permanent physical occupation by the 
government or others, that gove rnmental action constitutes a tak-
ing. The majority noted that a pe rmanent physical occupation 
would eXist whe re the public was give n the permanent right to pass 
along the Nollans' beach front. The case before the Court however 
involved the imposition of such an easement as a condir'ion to de: 
velopment, rather than an outright requirement that the easement 
be granted. 125 T he issue therefore, the majority stated, was whether 
requIrIng a latera l access easement as a condition for a building 
pe rmit also constituted a taking.I '6 
T he Court rej ected the contention of Justice Brennan that the 
I)rol)er standard to be ap I· d . .. I . 
. ". . p Ie m revlewmg and use regulatIons was 
the ratIonal relationsh ip" sta ndard , traditionally applied in equal 
-W id. a l 3 15 1 (Brennan, J ., dissenting) 
I t I fd. (Bre nnan . ] .. di ssenting) Ju ( BI k . Justice Stevens J'o i cd b J . . S Ice ac mUll fi led a sho rt dlssenl. See infra note 163. 
, n y lISl lCC B iackmull 'ilso fi l did· 12~ Id. ;u 3 146, 3 150. ' . 1 C a s lort ISSCIll. See infra note 163. 
m hi. at 3 148- 50. 
1 2~ /d. at 3 145. 
IU Id. 
11!ti Id. a l 3 146. 
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protection and due process cases. I27 The Court stated that it had 
long recognized that a land use regulation did not consti tute a 
taking as long as "it 'substantia lly ad vancers] legitimate state inter-
ests' and [does] not 'den[y] an owner econo mically viable use o f his 
land.""" T he Court admitted tha t its p r io r cases d id not elabora te 
the standards for evaluating what constitutes a "legitimate state 
interest" or what ty pe of connectio n between land use regula tion 
and state in te rest satisfi ed the requirement that the fo rmer "sub-
stantially advance" the latte r. " 9 
Assuming witho ut deciding that the state interests claimed by 
the Commission - pro tectin g the public's abili ty to see the beach, 
assisting the public in overcoming a "psycho logical bar r ie r" to shore-
front access, and preventing priva te congestio n of pu blic beaches 
- were legi timate state interests, the Court then turned to the issue 
of whether the second part o f the takings test had been satisfied : 
whether the permit conditio n imposed o n the Nollans "substantia ll y 
advanced" those legitimate state inte rests. ISO T he Court agreed with 
the Commission that a pe rmit conditio n that ad va nces the same 
legitimate state inte rest as a re fu sal to issue the permit does not 
constitute a taking if the refusal to issue the permit a ltogether would 
not constitute a ta king.'31 The Court explained that if the state as 
a legitimate exercise o f the police power could refuse to a llow the 
construction of the Nollans' house fo r the purpose o f p rotecting 
the public's ability to see the beach , the state could impose a con-
di tion, such as limiting height or width o f the ho me or even pro-
viding a viewing spot o n the pro perty, that served that same pur-
pose.'32 The Court noted tha t it wo uld be "strange" if the state 
could prohibit altogethe r the develo pmen t to se rve this purpose, 
but could not provide the landowne r a n a lternative to prohibition 
in the form of a conditio n serving the same purpose witho ut e ffec-
tuating a ta king. 133 
The constitu tional difficulty a rises, the maj ority continued , 
when the condition imposed "utte rly fa ils" to furthe r the state \11 -
terest advanced as a justifi cation for the p ro hibitio n. WIthout a 
nexus betwee n the condi tion and the original purpose o f the pro-
127 Id. at 3 147 n.S . 
n8 ld. at 3 146 (q uo ting Ag'i lls. 447 U.S. at 260). 
1'1') Id. at 3 146- 47. 
l:!O ld. at 3 147- 48. 
lSI ld. al 3 147. 
'S2 Id. at 3 147-48. 
'!S ld. at 3148. 
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hibition or restriction , the Court maintained, the condition allows 
the government to acquire an easement to serve a valid govern-
mental objective, but permits the government to aVOId paymg com-
pensation,"4 This, the Court ruled, constituted a taking of property 
without just compensatio n ' 35 The Court concluded that unless the 
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as barring 
development altogether, thus establishing a nexus between condi-
tion and legitimate state interest, the imposition of the condition 
constitutes an inva lid land use regulation ' 36 
Having established that a nexus between condition and legiti-
mate state interest must be shown to avoid an unconstitutional 
taking of property, the Court then turned to the issue of how close 
a nexus between permit condition and state interest was required,'" 
The Coastal Commission contended that a sufficient nexus could 
be established by a showing that the condition imposed on the 
landowner was reasonably related to the public need or burden that 
the development would affect. The Court refused to adopt this 
"reasonable relation " standard for determining how close a fit be-
tween permit condition and public need was required, but did 
accept this standard "for the purposes of discussion" because, ac-
cording to the Court, the nexus between condition and public need 
d,d not even satisfy this standard,"8 
In su pport of its position that the condition fai led even the 
"rational relation" test, the Court maintained that the condition 
imposed failed to advance the state interests alleged by the Califor-
l1Ia Coastal Commission, "9 According to the Court, the requirement 
that people on the beach be allowed to pass along the shorefront at 
the foot of the Nollans' property failed to reduce any barriers to 
~~ewll1g tl:e beach, failed to reduce any "psychological barrier" to 
e publIc s access to the ocean, and failed to remedy any additional 
congestion on the beach caused by the Nollans' construction of a 
new home On this ' d h C h ' 
, glOun ,t e ourt eld that a suffiCIent nexus 
between condition and public need sought to be alleviated by that 
condition (the legit ' t ' , 
_ Ima e state Interest) had not been establIshed, 
and thus the lIn position of th ' , , ' 
" e permit condItIon was an unconsU-
tULIonal taking of p Th C 
13 .. Id. 
1 3~ Set! ie/. 
136 1d. 
m /d, 
" " /d. 
"!l ld.'1I 3 149 . 
roperty, e ourt noted that its approach had 
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been followed by every court dealing with the constitutionality of 
permIt condItIOns wIth the exceptIon of the courts of California. 140 
The Court next responded to Justice Brennan's dissenting ar-
gument that the condition was rational in that it would allow persons 
looking from the road toward the beach to see people passing along 
the front of the Nollans' property, allowing them to overcome the 
psychological barrier burdening their access to the shorefront. '41 
The Court noted that the wall of houses completely blocked the 
view of the beach and thus a person on the road behind the Nollans' 
house would not be able to see the beach or anyone on it. The 
Court further noted that, even if Justice Brennan's contention were 
supported by the facts, it was not certain that there would be a 
sufficient nexus between the condition and public need to render 
the imposition of the condition valid. The majority stated that it did 
not share Justice Brennan's opinion that the Commission, because 
of its expertise in the land use area, would have little difficulty in 
the future in establishing a specific connection between condition 
and public need that would avoid the majority'S holding in Nollan. '42 
The takings clause is not an empty requirement, the majority 
maintained, easily satisfied by a minimally rational justification. 143 
To the contrary, the majority maintained that a showing of a min-
imally rational relationship between permit condition and public 
need sought to be alleviated would not be sufficient to avoid an 
unconstitutional taking of property. Instead, stated the majority, the 
government must show that the imposition of a permit condition 
"substantially advances" a legitimate state interest. The Court noted 
that it was inclined to be particularly careful in examining whether 
this standard had been met in permit condition cases , as in that 
context there existed a greater possibility that the government had 
imposed the condition to avoid the compensation requirement 
rather than to fulfill a stated police power objective. l44 . 
Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the permIt 
condition was not unreasonable. '45 Justice Brennan mamtamed that 
Ihe majority'S standard of review for the sufficiency of the nexus 
between condition and public need was too demanding. 146 By re-
14° ld. al 3149-50. 
14 1/d. at 3 150. 
1 4~.Id. 
IH /d. 
I,u /d. at 3 151 (Brennan , J., dissenting). 
''I6 ld. at315 1-54 (Brennan , j., dissenting). 
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quiring wha t Justice Brenna n termed a "precise fit " betwee n forms 
of burden and conditio n o n each IIldlvldua l parcel, the ma.Jonty was 
imposing a standard "di scred ited for the better part of this cen-
tury."'" Based o n the Co urt 's pr ior d ecisio ns in the police power 
a rea,148 Justice Bre nna n 1l1a inta ined that a review of the Slate's 
exercise of the police power demanded o nl y that the staLe "could 
rationall y have d ecided " that th e regula tion ado pted might achieve 
the state's objective. 149 
Justice Brennan maintai ned thaL the im pos itio n of the casement 
condition on the Noll ans was ra tiona ll y related to the state's objec-
tive and thus within the state's po lice power. I n support of this 
position , Justice Brennan d e fe rred 1.0 th e judg ment o f the Califor-
nia Coas ta l Commission. In its "info rmedjudg ment," Justice Bren-
nan argued, the Commission had d ecided thaL the g rant of a public 
easement would preserve the net amount of public access to Lhe 
shoreline.'50 Justice Brenna n mainta ined that this was enough to 
establish a rationa l relation bet:ween condition and public need, and 
thus the imposition of the conditio n was a va lid exercise of the 
police power. lSi 
Not only did the condition meet the "rational relation" test, 
asse rted Justice Brennan, but it m e t a more rigorous test, what he 
termed the majority'S "demand for a precise match between the 
condition imposed and the specific type of burden on access created 
by the appl icants." Disagreeing with the majority, Justice Brennan 
contended that the lateral access condition wou ld reduce the psy-
chologica l barrier to public recognition of access ible shorefront by 
allowlJ1g persons on the road behind the Nollan home to see people 
walklJ1g a long the waterfront. I" The majority, Justice Brennan ar-
gued , had assumed IJ1 correctly that the Comm ission was concerned 
only with blockage of visual access to the beach. Justice Brennan 
nOLed tha t the Commission also was concerned that the public, 
seelJ1g an IJ1crease IJ1 pnvate use of the shorefront , would believe 
that the shorefront was no longer publicly accessible . l53 The impo-
'
17 Id. at 315 1 (Brennan , J., d isseming) . 
'~qd. at 3 15 1 n . 1 (ll!-ennan J diss' . ) ( . ' . . 
Co 449 U S 456 466 9 '. ": cn tmg CHlIlg Mmnesota v, Clove l" Leaf Creamery 
. ". . '.' . ' ( I 8 1 ~ : Wll ha mso n v. Lee Optica l Co., 348 U.S. 483 487-88 (1955); 
0.1 ), Brne LIght Ing. Inc. v. Missouri. 342 US 421 (19"'» , 
119 /d. . . 3 _ . 
:: !d. ~t ~ 153 (~ rcnnan , j. , dissenting). 
I d. <It ~iS I 53-~4 ( l3J-ennan. J .• di ss~ llling) 
1.~2 hJ. at :1154 (Brennan.J .. <.Iisseming) . 
I ~' Id. al 3 155 (Brennan, J. . disse nting): 
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sition of the easement condition on the Nollans, Justice Brennan 
argued , would address this threat directly by affirming the public's 
right of access to the shorefront. l 54 Such a direct relationship be-
tween need and conditio n , Justice Bren nan contended, satisfied the 
majority's strict standard of review. ISS 
Justice Brennan acknowledged tha t, although the imposition of 
the access condition on the Nollans constituted a valid exercise of 
the police power, the conditio n might nonethe less constitute an 
unlawful taking of property if it went " too far" in restricting the 
landowner's use of his property. Justice Brennan obse rved that in 
measuring whether a land use regulation goes "too fa r, " the Court 
had traditionally evaluated the na ture o f the government's action 
and the economic impact of the regula tion. 1S6 Here, a rgued Justice 
Brennan, the physical and economic impact of the condition did 
not go too farl57 The extent of physical intrusion o n the Nollans' 
property was minimal, invo lving only a ten fOOl wide strip of land. ISS 
Justice Brennan also argued that the economic impact of the con-
dition on the value of the Nollans' property was de minimis; indeed, 
the Nollans' property had enjoyed an ino'ease in value even with the 
condition due to their replacement of a run-down bungalow with a 
new three bedroom house."9 The pe rmit conditio n did not disrupt 
the Nollans' investment-backed expectations , as they had no right 
under California law to excl ude the public from the shorefront; 
even if they had such a right, they had advance notice that new 
development along the coast was conditioned on provisions main-
taining public access to the ocean. Accordingly, Justice Brennan 
argued, the imposition of the condition did not have such an eco-
nomic or physical impact o n the Nollans' property that it rose to 
the level of an unconstitutional taking of property witho ut just 
compensation. 160 
Although Justice Brennan believed that the majority'S holding 
I,'as incorrect, he also believed that the ho lding in Nollan would have 
minimal impactl61 According to Justice Brennan, the Commission 
in the future would have li ttle trouble establishing a speCIfic con-
l)f Id. at 3155-56 (Brennan, j., disscllling). 
'J' Jd. at 3 156 (Brennan, J., d issenting), 
1~ /d. 
m id. al31S6-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
1!4 ld. at 3156 (Bren nan. J. . dissenting), 
I~ Jd. at 3 158 (Bren nan, J. . dissenting). 
160 Id. at 3158-60 (Brennan, j. , disscllling). 
161 [d. at 3161 (Brennan, J" dissenting). 
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nection between conditio n a nd public burden demanded by the 
majority. The reason the Commissio n did not do so in the present 
case, Justice Brennan conte nded , was beca use It had reasonably 
believed that its justifica tio n for the condition would satisfy the 
"reasonable relation" standard o f review fo r eva luating whether an 
exercise of the police powe r was consulUtio nal. 162 Now aware of the 
majority's more d emanding req uire me nt, the Coastal Commission 
cou ld readily tailor its justificatio ns fo r imposing permit conditions 
to meet this test in the fUlUre . 163 
IV. N OLLAN: ANALYS IS AND EFFECT 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court 
held that in order to be upheld as constilUtio nal , a permit condition 
162 1d. 
163 ld. Justice Blackmun a lso filed a disscllling opinion in Nollml. objecting (0 the major-
ity's holding on essentiall y the same grounds as Justice Bre nnan . Justice Blackmun argued 
that the majority had utilized an overl y-demanding standard in requ iring that the permit 
cond ili(;m "su bstalllially ad va nce" a legitimate stale inlereSl. Id. at 3 162-63 (Blackmun , j., 
d issenting). Justice Blackmun objected to lhe majority'S require ment of a close nexus between 
cOI~di tion ~nd public burden in o rder to uphold the im pos itio n of a permit condition as a 
,'a hd exe.r~ lse ?f the police power. Id. (B lackmun . J ., d issellling). I n Justice Blackmun's \·ie,,', 
the co ndlllo n In NoUan satisfied the ordina ry require me m that a sta tc's exercise of its police 
power need be no more tha n rationa lly based . Id. Coastal development, he argued, "by i[S 
ve ry .natur.e makes public access to the shore gene rall y more difficul t." /d. at 3 163 (Blackmun, 
J. , d,.s~entmg). The Nollans' develo pment, thercfo l'e, could be legitimate ly subjected 10 a 
condit/on that a latera l access easement ac ross their prope rty be gran ted to the public, as 
such an .easement wou ld at least in pan counteract the burden im posed by the development 
on pubhc access . Id. Justice Blackmun also agreed wit h Justice Bre nnan that no taking had 
?ccur.l"ed , as th.ere was no evidence o f a m-uor economic impact on the Nollans' property or 
mtcrf erence with their inves, b k d ' . . . r h 
. . . melll- ac e expeClallo ns as a res ult of the ImposlUon 0 t e 
permit condition . Id. Justice Stevens, joined by J ustice Blackmun dissented as well arguing 
(hal the Court's rece nt decision in First Eng lish Evangelica l Ch~rch of Glendale ~. County 
of Los Angcles, Ca li forn ia 107 S C, 2378 ( 1987 I ..... . 
h ..,. '" ), lad sen o us Imphcauons III No/Inn S1\'en ( e maJOrll Y s dispositio n of the Jd 3 163 . . . h 
h C case. . a t -64 (S tevens, J ., dissenting). In F,rst EngilS , t e ounty o f Los Angeles adop' d . . d' . E r h' e an IIlten m o r mance barring d evelopment on the First 
ng lSI E V31
d
l gehca i Church o f Glendale's property a fter a Rood had destroyed the Church's 
camp ocate o n the pmpert 107 S C . . d . I . ' . y. . l. at 238 1-82. In dismissing the Church's SU it for 
amages. t l C Cahf o rllla COUrt of A I I Id 
reli ef d . ppea s l C that the Church could seek o nly declaratory 
or man am liS barnng en for e f h . 
for the period d ' h ' h c me nt 0 t e ordlllance against its property, not damages 
unng w IC the regulat" I" . .. d 
al 2382-83 Th C r~ . Io n was app led pno r to being declared IIl vahd. I . 
Supreme Co' u,.,e a I ~ rnl3f Supreme Court d e nied review. Id. at 2383. The United States 
• assuming or th e pu ' p r . 
taking he ld tha t d . oses 0 argumelll th a t the ordinance did cons(J(ute a 
, amages could be re db ' . 
which a la nd use"e I . . covere y a property owner for the penod dUring 
, gu auon was Imposed ·· b . 2389. Justice Blackm d I pi lor to e lllg declared a taking. Id. at 2384-85, 
un argue tlat th e t ' d 
adopted in Nollan comb' d . h s n ct stan ard of re view for land use regulations 
me Wit the Coun 's hId ' . . .. 
effect on governments' ff. 0 IIl g In First English would have a chilling 
(Black lllull , J., diSse nting~. ~;~or~inr~gu la te .d evelopment. No.Llan, 107 S. Ct. at 3163-64 
standard of review ado pted b h g. y, .J u~tlce Blackmun again voiced his objection to the 
. . y t e maJo nty III Nolfa II h C 
10 FlrSl E1lglish. Id (Black J d" n as we as t e rule adopted by the ourt 
. mUll , " lSSenllng). 
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must "substantially advance" a legitima te state in terest164 I n order 
for a permit condition to "substantially advance" a legitimate state 
interest, the Court ruled that a sufficient nexus must be established 
between the permit condition and the public need it seeks to ad-
dress. 16' Where a sufficient nexus does not exist, the Court he ld 
the imposition of the permit condition constitutes a taking of prop: 
erty without just compensation 166 
The Court in Nollan acted consistently with its prior d ecisions 
in subjecting permit conditions to the "substantia lly advance" test 
in reviewing their constitutionality. Justice Brennan was correct in 
his assertion that in reviewing the constitutionality of government's 
exercise of the police power, the Court's prior decisions have gen-
erally applied a minimum rationality standard 167 The Court's de-
cisions in Penn Central and Agins v. Tiburon , however, clearly indicate 
that land use regulations do not fall within the scope of this genera l 
rule.l68 The Court's positio n in those cases is explicit. In justifying 
land use regulations, a showing that those regulatio ns are minimally 
rational is insufficient1 69 To avoid a taking, a land use regulation 
must "substantially advance" a legitimate state interest170 A condi-
tion imposed on a landowner, which he or she must meet to obtain 
a building permit, is clearly a land use regulation; thus, it follows 
that the "substantially advance" test should be used to determine 
the constitutionality of such permit conditions. 
The Court in Nollan held that this "substantia ll y advance" test 
is satisfied when a sufficient nexus ex ists between the imposed con-
dition and the public need it seeks to address. l71 This nexus re-
quirement makes sense in light of the underlying basis for imposing 
a permit condition on a property owner. As Pennsylvania Coal and 
the Court's subsequent decisions indicate, as long as their regula-
tions do not go "too far," governmenta l bodies may bar deve lopment 
for public purposes without violating the takings clause. l 72 As the 
Coun held in Nollan, it is self-evident that if government may bar 
development completely without committing a taking, it may make 
the lesser intrusion of allowing development subject to a property 
lfA Nollnn, 107 S. Cl. a t 3 146, 3 150. 
IM Id. al3 148. 
'66 ld. 
16' Set Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483. 487-88 (1955). 
168 Set supra nOtes 25-43 and accompanying [ext. 
I69 S ft supra notes 25-43 and accompanying text. 
110 Set supra nOles 25-43 and accompanying text. 
III Nollall, 107 S. Cl. a t 3 148. 
In PU/TIsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. al 415. 
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owner 's agreement to satisfy an imposed condition without com-
mitting a tak ing_ As the majo rity correctl y reasoned , however, the 
imposed condition must furth e r the sa me purpose as barring de-
velopment a ltoge the r. I f the conditio n does not further this pur-
pose, it ca n no lo nger be justifi ed under the same reasoningjusti-
fy ing the complete bar o f d eve lo pment. The condition in this 
instance no lo nge r represe llls a lesser intrusion for the same pur-
pose as the d evelopmelll ban , but rathe r constitutes a distinct intru-
sion on the propeny owne r's rig hts fo r a different purpose. The 
Coun thus correctly reasoned that a nex us must ex ist between the 
lesser imposed condition and the purpose o f a complete ban on 
development. 
Although the Coun pe rsuas ively suppo rted its colllemionthat 
a nexus must ex ist between the imposed pe rmit condition and the 
public burden or need created by the development, it did not es-
tablish a clear sta ndard for determining when a sufficient nexus 
ex ists so that the condi tio n "substalllia ll y ad va nces" a legitimate state 
interest. Rathe r than es tabli shing such a sta ndard , the Court in 
Nollan u tili zed the stand ard proposed by the California Coastal 
Commissio n to dispose of the case. ' ''' Adopting the Commission's 
"rational relationship" srandard " for purposes of discussion," the 
Coun found that the nexus between the pe rmit condition imposed 
on the Nollans and the public need created by their development 
was InsulfiCIelllly close to meet this minimal standardI" 
. This co nclusio n of the majority was correct. As the majority 
pOinted o ut, a ssuming that the Nollans' develo pment 1V0uid create 
a psychologICal ba rrier to the shorefront a nd increase private 
congestion on the beach , it is difficult to see how an easement 
allo' I bl ' Wing t l e pu IC to pass to a nd fro in front of the Nollans' seawall 
wou ld alleviate the impact o f the Nolla ns' development on the pub-
hc. T he Commissio n's a rgume nt that the view from the road of 
people on the beach reduces the psychologica l bar rier created by 
the home is speciou t b b I bl . s a est, eca use the wall of houses complete y 
ocks the view of people on the beach.l 75 It is also difficult to 
understand how allo' h hi ' . 
f· I ' Wing t e pu !e to pass a lo ng the shore In front o tle Nolla ns' home \ 0 Id II ' . h v u a eVlate przvate congestion on the beae 
created by the develo pm Th b ' . . . 
b ent. us, ecause little If any nexus eXIsted etll'een the permit d' . 
con Itlon a nd the public need created by the 
17'1, Nol/{l1I. I Oi S. Cl. at 3 148. 
IH Id. ,n 3 148-50. 
17:. /d. al 3 150. 
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NoJJans' development, the majority was correct in ho lding that the 
imposition of the permit condition on the Nollans constituted an 
unconstitutional taking of property. 
The Court thus properly disposed of the case befo re it, yet it 
failed to clearly set forth a standard for determining when the nexus 
between permit condition and public need is sufficiently close to 
satisfy the "substantially advance" test. The Court, in the interest of 
future cases, should not have simply adopted the "rational relation-
ship standard" for "purposes of discussion" because that standard 
was sufficient to dispose of the case. Instead, the Court should have 
explicitly adopted a standard for such review and applied that 
standard in the Nollan case. The Court would thus have established 
a clear reference for governmental bodies to decide under what 
circumstances permit conditions may constitutionally be imposed. 
By not adopting a standard, the Nollan d ecision is likely to confuse 
governmental bodies as to when permit conditions may be imposed 
without constituting a taking, and will create unnecessary litigation. 
Governmental bodies are not, however, tota lly without guid-
ance. Despite the Court's failure to explicitly adopt a standard for 
determining when the nexus between permit condition and public 
need is sufficiently close to satisfy the "substantially advance" test, 
it is possible to extract from the decision an indication of what 
governmental bodies must demonstrate to impose permit conditions 
on property owners. 
A showing that a "rational relationship" exists between permit 
condition and public need created by the proposed development, 
such as that required by the courts of California in Walnut Creek'76 
and Grupe,177 will be insufficient to pass constitutional scrutiny fol-
lowing Nollan. First, the Court in Nollan, although it utilized the 
"rational relationship" standard "for purposes of discussion," qual-
ified its use of this standard and refused to adopt it outright. Sec-
ond, in finding an insufficient nexus between permit condition and 
public need in Nollan, the Court, citing a number of state court 
cases, noted that its approach was consistent with the. approach 
utilized by every other court dealing with the constitutionality of 
permit conditions, with the exception of the courts of Call forma. 178 
In every case cited by the Supreme Court, the respective state court 
applied either the more stringent "rational nexus" or "umquely and 
176 See supra nOte 55 and accompanying text. 
m Ste supra nOle 61 and accompanying text. 
178 Nolilln, 107 S. Ct. at 3 149. 
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specifically attributable" tes ts. Third, the Court refused to display 
the considerable de fe re nce to leglslauve Judgment ll1herent In the 
"rational relatio nship" sta nda rd . AsJustice Brennan correctly noted 
in his dissent, the Court was unwilling to re ly solely on the expertise 
of the California Coastal Commissio n in de termining that the con-
dition imposed on the Nollans was necessa ry to preserve public 
access to the shorefront. 179 Instead , the Court closely examined the 
factual record before it, carefully weighing the merits of each of 
the Commission 's a rg ume nts based o n the facts of the case. The 
Court was unwilling to accept the gene ra l argument that any build-
ing along the shorefro nt necessa ril y has an adverse impact on the 
public's access to the shore, precise ly the kind of argumeJ1l readily 
accepted by courts a pplying the "rational re latio nship" test. ISO 
Finally, the majority's r esponse to Justice Brennan's contention 
that the California Coas tal Commission would have little difficulty 
in the future in utilizing its expertise to es tablish a sufficient con-
nection be twee n permit condition and public need reveals its rejec-
tion of the "rational relationsh ip" tes t. In disagreeing with Justice 
Brennan's opinion , the majority indica ted that it viewed its standard 
as requiring more than cleve rness and imagination in pleading. l8I 
The majority 'S response to Justice Brennan reflects an intention 
that the nexus be tween permit condition and public need be sub-
Jected to a more rigorous review than the minimal scrutiny inherent 
to the "rational relationship" test. Accordingly, following Nollan, 
governmental bodies must do more than merely establish the "ra-
lional relatIOnship" accepted as sufficient by the California courts 
In Walnut Greek a nd Grupe to avoid a finding that the imposition of 
a permit condition on a property owner represents an unconstitu-
tIOnal taking of property. 
Alt~ough the m'!iority did not adopt the least strict "rational 
relatIOn standard , the Nollan Court a lso failed to adopt the stricter 
model for review of permit conditions proposed by the Supreme 
Courts o f III1l10is l82 and Rhode Island ,183 requiring governmental 
bodies to establish tha t a deve lopment subject to a permit condition 
has c7eated rathe r than merely contributed to the public burden the 
condition purports to all . t F· h . . eVla e. Irst, t e Court did not reqUire that 
:: Id. al 3 162 (Bren nan , j. , dissent ing). 
Slit supra note 55. 6 1 and accompanying text 
lit Nollllli , 107 $ . Ct. at 3150. . 
:: Slit sllpm note 71 and accompanying text. 
Su supra note 77 and acco mpany ing text. 
May 19891 CASENOTES 931 
the Commission establish that the Nollans' development created the 
burden on public access to the shorefront and private congestio n 
on the beach. Second , it did not rej ect the no tion that a landowner 
may be constitutionally subjected to a permit condition imposed to 
address a public need to which he or she merely contributes. The 
Court instead noted that, had the Commission imposed as a permit 
condition a requirement which clea rl y would have alleviated the 
contribution of the Nollans' development o n the public's ability to 
see the beach - such as a height or width limita tio n or the provision 
of a public viewing spot on the property - a sufficient nexus would 
be established and no unconstitutional taking would have occurred . 
In light of the majority's acceptance of the Commission's argument 
that the Nollan development did no t in and of itself create this 
burden on public access, but merely contributed to its crea tio n as part 
of the overall pattern of development along the shore fro nt, the 
imposition of some ty pes of pe rmit conditio ns on the Nollans may 
not have constituted a taking, despite the fact tha t their develop-
ment merely contributed to rather than created the relevant public 
need. This position dearly is inconsistent with the "uniquely and 
specifically attributable" standard. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Court held tha t its approach in 
reviewing the constitutionality of permit conditions was consistent 
with courts utilizing the "ratio nal nexus" as well as the mo re strin-
gent "uniquely and specifically attributable" test indicates that the 
standard of review adopted by the Court in Nollan is not as rigorous 
as the "uniquely and specifically a ttributable" standard. Had the 
Court adopted this more stringent approach , it would not have also 
cited cases applying a less taxing standard as consisten t with the 
majority'S approach. Thus, the Court in Nollan did not. adopt 
"uniquely and specifically attributable" as the standard for reVleWll1g 
the constitutionality of permit conditio ns. 
The Court in Nollan, it appears, has instead adopted a standard 
of review of permit conditions akin to the "rational nexus" s tandard 
adopted by the Florida court in Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade 
Counti s, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin i~ Jordan v. ~tllage 
o[Menomonee Fallslss Like courts utilizing the "ratIo nal nexus stan-
dard, the majority in Nollan was unwilling to show great deference 
to local governmental bodies and accept a broad, general a rgument 
justifying the impositio n of a permit conditio n on a property owner. 
l~ Ste supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
II» Stt supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
- - .. .;.~, 
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Also con sistent with the courts a pplying the "rational nexus" test, 
the majority in Nollan, as no ted , did not require that the Nollans' 
pro posed develo pment create the public need the imposed c,?ndition 
sought to a llevia te. Instead , as do courts applying the .ratlonal 
nexus" test, the Court in Nollan undertook a close inquIry Into the 
facts o f the case to d ete rmine whe the r the permit condition would 
actually address the public burden crea ted by the Nollans' devel-
opment. 
The Court a lso stated tha t it was inclined to be "more careful" 
in reviewing whethe r pe rmi t conditions satisfy the "substantially 
advance" standa rd, as in tha t context there exists a greater possi-
bility that the pur pose of the conditio n was to avoid the compen-
sa tio n requirement, ra the r than the sta ted police power objective. 
Implicit in this sta tem ent is the Court 's concern that the impact of 
a development on the community could be used as a pretext for 
imposing a conditio n o n a deve lo pment which does not address the 
development's impact on the public. The "more ca reful" review 
proposed by the Court, consistent with the a pproach of courts 
applying (he "rational nexus" test, requires a close examination of 
the facts o f the case to ensure tha t the condition imposed addresses 
the deve lopment's effect on the public, and is not merely a method 
of unjustifiably acquiring property rights without compensation. 
T hus, having implicitly adopted in Nolian the "rational nexus" 
standard , the Supreme Court has indicated to governmental bodies 
what they must establish in order to impose permit conditions on 
pro perty owners withou t committing a taking. On the one hand, 
broad a rguments made in gene ral terms purporting to establish a 
nexus betwee n permit conditio n and public need will not be enough, 
because under this standard courts are unwilling to grant unlimited 
deference to the Judgments of local governmental bodies. On the 
other hand , local governments will not be required to establish that 
the develo pment upon which the permit condition is imposed itself 
created the partICula r public burden ; they must be prepared, how-
ever, to SubmIt eVIdence establishing in concrete and clear terms 
that the Imposed condition addresses the adverse impact on the 
publIc resultmg fro m th d I 
. . e eve opment. The outcome of these cases 
WIll necessanly depend o n the facts and circumstances of each 
case. IS6 
186 An excellent example of su h b . . . 
for determining wheth Id e a case· y-case analYSIS IS the Supre me Court's basiC (est 
cr a an -use rcgulat" . 
Peopen ... th aI ;t const' t I Io n so restricts a landowner's use of his or her 
I lu es an unconstitu( I k" '. ' . lo n a ta 109 withoU1JUSl compensation. As Jusuce 
May 1989] CASENOTES 933 
V. NOLLANS IMPACT ON LINKAGE PROGRAMS 
The Supreme Court's holding in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission is likely to pose the same kinds of challenges to local 
governments adopting linkage programs as those faced by local 
governments in imposing pe rmit conditions. Local governments 
cannot simply rely on the broad, general argument that because 
office developments add j obs and people to the city, thus exacer-
bating the city's housing shortage, developers should be required 
to construct low and moderate income housing as a condition prec-
edent to development approval. Afte r Nollan, courts will be unwill-
ing, or in any case unable, to afford city authorities this kind of 
substantial deference. Neither, however, will city authorities be re-
quired to establish that the pa rticular development at issue itself 
solely created the housing shortage sought to be alleviated by the 
imposition of the linkage condition. 
What will be required o f cities pursuing linkage programs is an 
in-depth, empirical analysis demonstrating that the theoretical ar-
gument advanced as a justification for linkage has a concrete basis 
in fact. Such an analysis, revealing in statistical terms a direct rela-
tionship between the construction of office develo pments and an 
exacerbation of the city'S housing shortage, would establish clea rly 
that linkage programs serve to alleviate the housing shortage cre-
ated by the developments and are not merely a pretext for imposing 
an obligation on a develope r to remedy a public need wholly un-
related to his or her activity. 
An example of such an empirical analysis likely to establish a 
sufficient nexus under Nollan between pe rmit condition and public 
Holmes stated in Pmns)'ivallla Coal , "[ tJhe general rule a t least is thal wh ile property may be 
regulated lO a ce rtain extent, if a regulation goes tOO f~r it will be rec?gnized as a ~aking. " 
260 U.S. 393, 415 ( 1922). The difficult fo llow· up question , of cou rse, IS at whal J>?lIll ~oes 
a regulation go "too far"? The Court has responded lO the inherent vagueness of tillS takmgs 
standard with an essentially ad-hoc. case-by-case analysis based on th e particular facts of ~~ch 
casco Su, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 122. 124 ( 1978). Wntmg 
for the majority in Penn Central, Justice Brennan wrote: 
The question o f what constilU tes a "taking" for purposes of the 4th Amendme.nt 
has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty . .. . rT]his ~o~rt. qU lLe 
simply, has been unable to develop any "sct rormula" for determ~nlllg. whe n 
'J ustice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensated by the government. . .. Indeed. we have frequ en tl y observed th~t 
whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government s 
fa ilure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largeLy "lipon the 
particular circumslauces of t/ud case." .. C 3·7 U S 
Id. at 123-24 (emphasis added) (citing United S lateS v, Central E.ure ka Mmmg 0.,:> . . 
155, 168 (1958)). 
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need involved in linkage programs is the study undertaken by the 
city of Boston. In 1986, the Boston Redeve[opment Authorityau-
thorized an extensive study of Its linkage program, takmg Into 
account such factors as the growth of office development employ-
ment in Boston, the extent to which such employees actually lived 
within the city of Boston, the extent the add ition of office devel-
opments contributed to the city's ho using shortage, and the effect 
of that exacerbation of the housing shortage on the cost of housing 
in the city.1 8' In justifying its linkage program, '88 Boston has nOl 
merely relied o n a theoretical argument that office developments 
add jobs to the city and increase the population , exacerbating the 
city's housing shortage. Instead , Boston has undertaken an in-depth 
study establishing in concrete, statistica l terms a direct relationship 
between office development in Bosto n and an exacerbation of the 
city's housing shortage. 189 Based on this wealth of empirical data, 
the study concluded that office development in Boston directly 
contributed to the increased need for housing in the city.l90 
This kind of detailed , empirical ana lysis supporting the theo-
retical argument that office development exacerbates urban housing 
needs is likely to satisfy the Nollan requirement that there be a 
sufficient nexus between the permit condition imposed on a prop-
erty owner and the public burden that condition seeks to address. 
Such a study wo uld establish a direct , concrete link between con-
dition and public burden, removing the need for courts to show 
great deference to the judgment of municipal authorities and allay-
IIl g fears tha t the linkage condition imposes a requirement on a 
developer to alleVIate a burden he or she played no part in creating. 
lin Kayden Case & P II d TJ . 
. ,oar , te Lmkage B e/ween Office Development and flotlSing Costs in 
the CII)' ur B osloll in LINKAe,' C ,. 
•• 'J , "' O N'RACT AND I NCLUS IONARY ZON ING: USE OF ZON ING FOR 
OnlER THAN LAND USE PU""O' 2 19 2" C 
'" ES - !) (M LE, Inc. 1986) [hcre ina rtc r Ka yden Case & 
Po ll ard I. ' 
IH~ T he Cit , f B ' ]' k 
Z . C d ) 0 051.O n S In age program was adopted in 1983 as Article 26 of the City ~o llln g 0 c. Kayde n & Poll - d L · k . . C . . B ar , In age OrduuHlces and T raditional Exactions Alwlym: The 
AOIl1lI:CllOd" I" bween Office Deuelopment and H ousing, 50 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS 130-31 (1987), s ,linen e( }' Article 26A - d d ' ' , 
build ', 19 I ' ,a Opte In 1986, th e Code req ui res thal the developer of any 
I la,'m g a gross Ooor are' f I 
tha t its g"O A a 0 more tlan 100,000 sq uare fect or that is enlarged so 
, ss oor area exceed s 100 000 r 
pces'lu3rc foot I' n _,' " square leet must agree to pay a fee of five dollars o ooral ea 111 cxcess of 100000 c . . h isslnncc o f a b 'Id' . ' ,square leel as a conditio n precedent LO t e 
• < UI 109 pe l"llHl, lei The · " . low and mode"al' I ' . se payments are III turn used for the construction of 
< e Iilcomc lOUSlI1g Th d · I . 
th e fund actu a lly co I ' I ' e eve o per may, as an alter native 10 contribut1Jlg to 
, ns luct ow and mod ' " 
which wou ld ha ve be . I I h crate IIlcome housmg In an a mo unt equal to that 
e n <1 ) e to ave bec b'l . I 
III', K- l e n UI tWit 1 the exaction fee lei 
<1 )' ( en, ase & Pollard , su/n'a 18 7 . . 
a t 132-36, notc , at 21 8; see Kaydcn & Polla rd , supra note 188. 
1% Ka)'dc n , Case & Polla rd , supra note 187 , a t21 8. 
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CONCLUSION 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission is significant in that the 
United States Supreme Court for the first time applied its general 
standard of review for land use regulations, the "substantially ad-
vance" test, to permit conditions. In order to meet this standard, 
the Court held that a sufficient nexus must exist between the permit 
condition imposed and the public need the condition seeks to ad-
dress. Although the Court did not explicitly state the standard for 
determining whether this nexus is "sufficient," the context of the 
decision as a whole indicates that in future permit condition cases, 
the Court will apply the "rational nexus" standard used by several 
state courts. 
In adopting this standard, the Court has struck the proper 
balance between the need to allow governmental bodies sufficient 
authority to regulate development and mitigate its adverse impact 
on the community, and the rights of property owners protected by 
the fifth amendment. By requiring governmental bodies to submit 
evidence establishing that the condition imposed actually addresses 
the impact of the development on the community, a landowner is 
unlikely to be subjected unfairly to a permit condition that bears 
no relation to the public burden to which his development contrib-
utes. Certainly, it is not unfair to compel a property owner to submit 
to a permit condition that legitimately addresses a burden he or she 
placed on the public. At the same time, requiring local government 
to meet this standard does not impede its ability to mitigate the 
adverse impact of growth and development on the community. 
Instead, it merely ensures that state and local governments will not 
impose permit conditions on property owners without first inquir-
ing as to whether such conditions actually address the public need 
to which the developments contribute. As a result of the Nollan 
decision, governmental bodies will be required to think through 
their imposition of permit conditions on property owners and en-
sure that the imposition of such conditions is justified. Whenever 
government gives careful consideration to the baSIS for their actions 
prior to taking action, all of society benefits. 
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